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Continuity and Discontinuity: From Antisemitism to  
Antizionism and the Reconfiguration of the Jewish Question
David Seymour
Analogy . . . does not save us the work of comparison. 
—Robert Fine and Philip Spencer 1
INTRODUCTION
Today, antizionism, like antisemitism before it, 
is coming to serve as a rallying call that, tran-
scending regional and national borders, is taking 
on an almost global complexion. And, again like 
its predecessor, antizionism could well be on its 
way to gaining ascendancy over other compet-
ing “isms”2 as a rallying call to the disaffected. 
Antizionism, in other words, risks reigniting the 
Jewish question and putting Jews once again in 
“the storm centre of events.”3 Using Hannah 
Arendt as my guide, I offer some reflections on 
the nature, meaning and consequences of the 
shift from antisemitism to antizionism or, more 
accurately, from the ideology of antisemitism to 
the ideology of antizionism.
A recurring question within some sec-
tions of antisemitism studies is the “hyphen”. 
Should we write “anti-Semitism” or “antisem-
itism”? It seems, however, that consensus has 
now been reached. Despite the existence of 
“semite” or “semitic” as a legitimate category 
within the study of languages. in the context 
of antisemitism, there is, in reality, no “semite” 
or “Semitism” to be “anti.” Antisemitism was, 
and is, never about Jews: it is about the concept 
of “the Jews” imagined by antisemites. With 
this thought in mind, I turn to the question of 
antizionism.
If it is the case that antisemitism has nothing 
to do with (flesh and blood) Jews, but has every-
thing to do with the image of “the Jews” it con-
jures up, so too is antizionism detached from 
both the theory and practice of Zionism and 
the State of Israel. Intimations of this detach-
ment between imagination and reality, between 
anti-Zionism as opposition to an actuality and 
antizionism as “opposition” to its own imagi-
nation of what “Israel” and “Zionism” “is,” is 
often present, but the relevant conclusions of 
this detachment are rarely drawn. Thus, Alvin 
Rosenfeld notes,
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Those who hold aggressive views [about Israel 
and Zionism] . . . hide behind the facade of 
anti-Zionism [sic], but the issue here is not 
Zionism. Most of today’s fervent anti-Zionists 
[sic] probably know little, if anything, about 
Zionism and simply do not like Jews or the 
Jewish state.4
Here, Rosenfeld is intimating that, like 
“antisemitism” (which he writes without a 
hyphen), “anti-Zionism” (which includes the 
hyphen) has nothing to do with the theory, his-
tory, and practice of Zionism as it has existed 
in the real world. The presence of the hyphen, 
however, dilutes that insight leaving the nature 
of the Zionism that is actually opposed ambiv-
alent or ambiguous. Is it referring to actually 
existing Zionism or to the imaginative projec-
tions of antizionists onto their own image of 
Zionism and Israel? 
This “merely” semantic point has vast impli-
cations, not least because not addressing it may 
be ceding too much ground to the distortions 
that are the essence of antizionism. More specif-
ically, it highlights the core of the issue—that of 
the continuities and discontinuities within the 
history of anti-Judaic praxis.
There is little doubt that the concept 
“antisemitism” is used often as generic short-
hand for this entire history from its earliest 
beginnings in classical and pagan times through 
to the present. At other times, however, it refers 
uniquely to the modern period beginning 
sometime in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century.5 Yet, even when used in this narrower 
sense, “antisemitism” is subject to further dis-
tinctions: liberal antisemitism, nationalist 
antisemitism, genocidal antisemitism, cultural 
antisemitism, political antisemitism, antise-
mitic antizionism, and so forth. In the present 
context, though, confusion and controversy 
surrounds not so much antisemitism’s starting 
point, but rather its (putative) endpoint.
For those who reduce the distinction 
between antisemitism and anti-Zionism to a 
matter of form rather than content, continuity is 
emphasized. For example, Rosenfeld character-
izes, anti-Zionism as a “newer form [of antisem-
itism], a “resurgent antisemitism,” a “façade,” a 
“label,” and a “camouflage term”6 the purpose 
of which is to hide “older forms” of antisemi-
tism (that, after the Holocaust, dare not speak 
their names). In this sense, therefore, antizion-
ism is presented as little more than “old wine in 
a new bottle.”
Conversely, antizionists stress a radical dis-
continuity between the two. They argue that, 
even if traces remain, antisemitism ended in 
the mid-twentieth century, coinciding with the 
end of the Holocaust and the defeat of Nazism.7 
This view is accompanied often by the belief 
that Jews are today, fully and finally, not only 
assimilated into their host countries, but also 
share the same privileges as the most dominant 
sectors of those societies.
The political stakes at issue on the question 
of continuity and discontinuity should not be 
underestimated. If antizionism is separate per se 
or has shed any antisemitism, then antizionism 
can take its place among the respectable (if con-
tested) political ideas of the present moment. 
This idea is illustrated in the byline to an 
article discussing the recent attempts to ban 
Jewish marchers from the Washington, DC, 
Dyke March on the grounds that their flag 
contained the Star of David. For those seeking 
exclusion, this symbol was said to represent 
“Zionism,” while the Jewish contingent argued 
that it represented Jews and Judaism:
IfNotNow’s support for barring the Jewish 
Pride flag from the Dyke March was another 
example of the failure to distinguish anti- 
Zionism from antisemitism. The left’s overall 
ability to make the distinction, and challenge 
antisemitism in its ranks, has been a key source 
of the progressive movement’s weakness. To 
overcome it, we need clearer boundaries and 
a new agenda for the Jewish left.8
In other words, if only antizionism can be freed 
from the taint of antisemitism, its political 
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legitimacy can be secured. Antizionism can then 
take its place within the world of “rational” debate 
alongside that, of say, Brexit or housing shortages.
Rather than treating the question of the 
connection of antisemitism with antizion-
ism as an either/or—one that does injustice 
to both—I approach the matter dialectically. 
This approach allows us to recognize the nov-
elty of antizionism at the same time as recog-
nizing antisemitism as one of its elements. Put 
in different terms, antizionism subsumes the 
antisemitism(s) of the past just as “modern” or 
“classic” antisemitism contained within it ear-
lier, premodern forms of anti-Judaic praxis. In 
this way, any implication that non-antisemitic 
antizionism is legitimate can be challenged. I 
am arguing, in other words, that antizionism 
can never be legitimate contemporary political 
speech in the way that anti-Zionism may have 
been in the nineteenth century through to the 
mid-twentieth century.
In what follows, I will place the dialectic of 
continuity and discontinuity in the connec-
tions between antizionism and antisemitism in 
the broader framework of the Jewish question. 
The advantage of this approach is that, on the 
one hand, it recognizes an overarching (nega-
tive) narrative of Jews’ relationship to the world 
in which they are a part, while, on the other 
hand, it recognizes historically distinct forms 
each with its own content in which the attempt 
to keep Jews apart have been articulated. The 
Jewish question, therefore, allows us to under-
stand and explore the “universality” of that 
question in its particular articulations.
The Jewish Question
In their recent investigation, Robert Fine and 
Philip Spencer identify the jewish question as 
emerging in opposition to Jewish emancipation. 
Posing as “objective” or “innocent,” the Jewish 
question, they demonstrate, is little more than 
an anti-emancipationist tautology.9
Beginning with “the idea of the Jewish ques-
tion [as] the classic term for the representation 
of Jews as harmful to humanity as a whole,” Fine 
and Spencer break the “question” into three 
interrelated parts: “the nature of the harm Jews 
supposedly inflict on humanity, the reasons why 
the Jews are so harmful and what is to be done 
to remedy this harm.” The “answers” provided, 
though diverse, are, nonetheless, unified by an 
overriding negativity and hostility; they pro-
vide a litany of crimes and wrongdoings which 
include, but not exhausted by: “economic harms 
like usury and financial manipulation; political 
harms like betrayal and conspiracy; social harms 
like exclusivity and indifference toward others; 
moral harms like greed and cunning; and cul-
tural harms like abstract intellectualism and 
contempt for nature.” 
Likewise, the varied reasons and causes for 
such Jewish harmfulness include, “the restor-
ative conditions in which they were once forced 
to live, the ‘tribal’ assumptions of Judaism 
as a religion, the ‘self-promotion’ of Jews as 
the ‘chosen people,’ the virulent character of 
‘Jewishness’ itself and . . . the self-fulfilling 
effects of antisemitic labelling.”
It is in the wake of these harms and the rea-
sons proffered that the “question” gives rise to 
a diversity in unity of “answers” or “solutions.” 
These responses range from the seemingly 
benign (which do nothing to challenge the ques-
tion a priori, but rather assume its terms) such 
as, improving “‘the Jews’ ‘defective’ moral char-
acter . . . combatting the mindset of antisem-
ites,” to overtly “malign solutions” including, 
“rolling back the rights of Jews, expelling Jews 
from their host countries to some foreign terri-
tory [and vice-versa] and eradicating Jews from 
the face of the earth.”10
What is important is that
we find that the Jewish question keeps 
re-appearing in different times, in different 
places. It is like a ghost that haunts how others see 
Jews and sometimes how Jews see themselves.11
As will become apparent, understood in the 
 context of the Jewish question, “therefore, 
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antizionism is one of re-appearance. Both con-
tinuous and discontinuous with prior mani-
festations, antizionism articulates a particular 
historically situated moment within the over-
arching presence of the Jewish question as a 
whole.
The Jewish Question, Antisemitism, and 
Antizionism: Continuity and Discontinuity
The dialectic of continuity and discontinuity 
has been a constant feature within the history 
of the Jewish question. Each new formulation 
of the Jewish question is accompanied by what 
I have termed elsewhere, the play of disavowal 
and distinction.12 This play expresses itself in 
the opening gambit of a disavowal from prior 
articulations of the question, followed imme-
diately by drawing a distinction between the 
disavowed history and a new “novel” contribu-
tion. Often, authors articulate this duality of 
disavowal and distinction with claims to “objec-
tivity” such that, though some might find what 
they have to “report” as negative as regards “the 
Jews,” their own work is the result of the rigor-
ous rules of academic and scientific endeavor.
Two examples of this phenomenon can be 
offered—the first from the dawn of the concept 
“antisemitism,” and the second in the more con-
temporary shift from antisemitism to “antizion-
ism.” Thus, in the opening sentences to The 
Victory of Judaism over Germanism, Wilhelm 
Marr (attributed with coining the pseudo- 
concept13 “antisemitism”) writes,
What I intend to accomplish is less a polemic 
against Judaism than it is a statement of facts 
regarding cultural history. I, therefore, uncon-
ditionally defend Jewry against all religious 
prosecution and this it is hardly more possible 
to express this more closely than I have done 
here. . . . On the other hand, I emphasise the 
indisputable truth. With the Jews, the Romans 
have forced a tribe on the West which, as his-
tory shows, was thoroughly hated by all peo-
ples of the world.14 
Just over a century and a quarter later, writing 
in what he sees as the errors of speaking of a 
“new antisemitism” (i.e. antizionism), Alain 
Badiou applies the same rhetoric of disavowal 
and distinction:
This being the case, it doesn’t seem to me that 
in data [recording antisemitism], which are 
freely available, are such that they justify a full 
alert, although it should be clear that, on such 
questions, the imperative of vigilance admits of 
no interruption. . . . Nowadays, Jews are pretty 
well integrated, and this kind of antisemitism 
and racism finds other targets. . . . Today, it is 
not uncommon to read that “Jew” is a name 
beyond ordinary names. And it seems to be 
presumed that, like an inverted original sin, 
the grace of having been an incomparable 
victim can be passed down not only to descen-
dants but to all who come under the predicate 
in question, be they heads of states or armies 
engaging in the severe oppression of those 
whose lands they have confiscated. 15
On the other side of the coin is what Hannah 
Arendt refers to as “eternal antisemitism”16 and 
which, to all intents and purposes, reduces 
anti-Jewish hostility to little more than a “law 
of nature.” In her account, specific instances of 
antisemitism are seen as, “normal and natural 
reaction[s] to which history gives only more or 
less opportunity.” For Arendt, three problems 
follow from this approach. First, no further 
explanation is deemed necessary, but rather 
manifestations of antisemitism are treated as 
“natural consequences of an eternal problem”:
If it is true that mankind has insisted on kill-
ing Jews for the past two thousand years, then 
Jew-killing is a normal, and even human, occu-
pation and Jew-hatred is justified beyond the 
need of argument.17
Secondly, and following on from this point, if it 
were true that antisemitism was akin to a “natural 
phenomenon,” it would, almost by definition, 
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absolve antisemites of their individual respon-
sibility on the grounds that one cannot escape 
one’s own (human) nature.18 And, thirdly, as we 
shall see in more detail below, “eternal antisem-
itism” mirrors the Jewish question in the sense 
that specific articulations of anti-Judaism appear 
as little more than abstract “repetitions” of the 
same “natural” phenomenon.
A more promising approach to the play 
of continuity and discontinuity is David 
Nirenberg’s recent encyclopedic Anti-Judaism: 
The Western Tradition. The image Nirenberg 
presents is of a historical “snowballing” of 
anti-Judaic thought and images in which ideas 
developed in earlier anti-Jewish manifestations 
serve as resources for and come to be included 
in later instances.” Each renaissance of anti- 
Judaism, therefore, comprises a mixture of its 
forerunners while at the same time expresses 
something new or novel. However, as Fine and 
Spencer note, although Nirenberg “captures 
very well the recurrence of the Jewish question 
both in traditional and modern societies . . . 
[he] is less dedicated to working out what keeps 
it alive in the modern world.”19 
This lacuna within Nirenberg’s work is the 
lack of consideration of the connection between 
the ideas of a given era and the social and polit-
ical conditions in which they are located. In the 
context of this essay, therefore, the change in 
those conditions—the founding of the State of 
Israel in 1948 as a homeland for the Jews—is 
central to inaugurating a new episode in the 
overarching history of the Jewish question. As 
we will discover, 1948 presents a shift from 
antisemitism to antizionism or, rather, from 
the ideology of antisemitism to the ideology 
of antizionism. It is in this discussion that the 
interplay of continuity and discontinuity within 
the Jewish question appears in relief.
The Jewish Question as Ideology
Fine and Spencer’s definition of the Jewish 
question as an idea of “Jews as harmful to 
humanity as a whole” indicates that we have left 
the realm of reality and entered that of “ideol-
ogy.” What, then, is the meaning of ideology in 
general? And what is its connection to Jews in 
particular? It is to Hannah Arendt’s account of 
these issues that I will now turn.
Arendt’s understanding of ideology turns on 
its inherent connection with a totalitarian worl-
dview. This connection expresses itself by the 
ways in which ideology presents itself as a key 
to history and, as such, reduces entire swathes 
of history and the present—along with all their 
conflicts and complexities, contradictions, and 
contingencies—into a unidimensional, prede-
termined “theory”:
Ideologies pretend to know the mysteries of 
the world-historical processes—the secret of 
the past, the intricacies of the present, the 
uncertainties of the future—because of the 
logic inherent in their respective ideas.20 
Arendt explains this point further by noting that 
the logos (the -ology) of ideology resides not in its 
erstwhile subject matter or content, but rather in 
the belief that it is the idea itself that possesses its 
own logic and propels it forward. Arendt’s point, 
therefore, is that an ideology tells us nothing of 
the historical, social, or political developments 
that it pretends to capture in its presentation 
of the world, but, rather, that it is the idea that 
becomes “the subject matter of science itself.”21 
Nowhere is her observation more on point than 
with the Jewish question in all its manifestations. 
For example, the ideology of antisemitism tells 
us nothing about Jews, but everything about the 
nature and development of the antisemitic idea 
of “the Jews.” In the same way, the ideology of 
antizionism tells us more about itself than it does 
about Israel, Zionism, and what is euphemisti-
cally referred to as its “supporters.” For Arendt, 
then, the study of the ideology of antisemitism 
and/or antizionism, is the study of an idea and 
the logic of its propulsion:
Ideological thinking orders facts into an abso-
lutely logical procedure which starts from an 
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axiomatically accepted premise, deducing 
everything else from it; that is, it proceeds with 
a consistency that exists nowhere in the realm 
of reality.22 
For the Jewish question, therefore, the “axiom-
atically accepted premise,” and its “key to his-
tory,” is the “harmfulness of Jews to the rest of 
humanity.”
However, it is important to recognize that 
the specific content of an ideology cannot exist 
without at least some connection with the 
actually existing world, no matter how much 
its incorporation suffers malevolent distortion. 
Without this tenuous connection, ideologies in 
general and the ideologies of antisemitism and 
antizionism in particular, would simply not 
have the power or traction to convince popula-
tion after population of their claims to explain 
(away) the complexities of past and present (and, 
it follows, the uncertainties of the future) and to 
re-present these complexities as little more than 
repetitious “proofs” of their initial idée fixe. 
Nowhere is this point more in evidence than 
in Arendt’s own account of the Jewish question 
that comprises the first section of The Origins 
of Totalitarianism.23 Although Arendt does not 
express it in this way (the section of ideology 
was written later) it can be read as tracing 
the way in which the actual history of Jewish 
relations (including Jewish agency) within the 
emerging nation-state crystallized into their 
particular ideological formation: the ideol-
ogy of antisemitism. She illustrates the way in 
which the content of that ideology presents a 
radical, malevolent distortion, if not mythol-
ogization, of the actually existing social and 
political relations and the place and agency of 
Jews within them.
It is in this context that we read how and why 
some Jews came to be involved in financing both 
absolute monarchs and the early modern state. 
We read how and why, in this political context 
national “Court Jews” or “State Jews” main-
tained, and were expected to maintain, trans-
national family and communal connections; 
how and why such connections resulted in 
Jewish families funding opposing armies while 
also ensuring channels through which the war-
ring nations could communicate; and, finally, 
how and why Jews could also serve as the finan-
ciers of peace conferences and treaties. We read 
that Jewish emancipation’s uneven develop-
ment (the reasoning behind which section of a 
nation’s Jewry was emancipated and when) was 
intimately connected to this intimacy between 
Jews and the state. We also learn why some of 
the sons and grandsons of these Jewish families 
were attracted to and entered the liberal pro-
fessions and the “culture industries” and why 
others were drawn to social democratic and rev-
olutionary politics. Naturally, Arendt describes 
the toll assimilation took on Jews, which in turn 
gave rise to talk of “Jewishness.”
It does not take a great leap of the imagi-
nation to see how these social and political 
realities were distorted through the lens of the 
Jewish question and its articulation through 
the ideology of antisemitism. Animated by its 
“axiomatically accepted premise” of the “harm-
fulness” of what now became “the Jews,” and 
captured within its unfolding stream of non-
sense, these realities reappeared in the ideo-
logical staples that Jews are the “power behind 
the throne”; that “the Jews” dominate and con-
trolled national and international finance and 
financial markets; that “no war can be fought 
without the agreement of “the Rothschilds”; 
that all wars are fought for Jewish interests and 
from which only “the Jews” will profit; that “the 
Jews” constitute a transnational secret world 
power to which all national governments and 
international organizations were in thrall and to 
whom they had to bow; that “the Jews” control 
the media; that “they” are both capitalists and 
communists. In short, “Jewishness” became an 
innate and determining essence of “the Jews” 
from which all these harmful attributes could 
be traced and the Jewish question explained. 
However, it is important to emphasize here 
what Arendt is not saying about the (tenuous) 
connection between Jewish agency and the 
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ideologization of antisemitism. She is not making 
antisemitism’s claim that antisemitism is an 
unmediated consequence of what Jews do or 
not do. What she is saying is that that agency, 
that acting in the world, once ensnared within 
the unfolding logic of the Jewish question, is 
distorted and mythologized within its unwaver-
ing malevolent narrative.
This point comes into relief through one of 
Arendt’s own critical comments on the Zionist 
movement four years before the founding of the 
State of Israel. With hindsight, it is of special 
interest since it is often cited by antizionists as 
showing that Arendt herself believed Jews and 
Zionists were responsible for bringing down 
upon themselves the wrath of Jew-hatred.
In her 1944 essay, Zionism Reconsidered, 
Arendt expressed dismay and disappointment 
in the direction Zionism was taking. Criticizing 
the decision of the “General Zionists” to seek 
assistance for the creation of Israel from the 
“big [i.e. colonial] powers” rather than seek-
ing agreements with the Arab inhabitants of 
Mandate Palestine and its neighbors, she writes:
If, in the present situation, the powers should 
be willing to help the establishment of the 
Jewish homeland, they could do so only on the 
basis of a broad understanding that takes into 
account the whole region and the needs of all 
its peoples. On the other hand, the Zionists, 
if they continue to ignore the Mediterranean 
peoples and watch out only for the big far-
away powers, will appear only as their tools, the 
agents of foreign and hostile powers.24
The sentence that follows immediately spells 
out the implication of the previous lines:
Jews who know their own history should be 
aware that such a state of affairs will inevitably 
lead to a new wave of Jew-hatred; the antisemi-
tism of tomorrow will assert that Jews not only 
profiteered from the presence of big powers in 
that region, but had actually plotted it and are 
guilty of the consequences.25
In these passages, the appearance of the relation-
ship between Jewish agency and the ideology of 
antisemitism is clearly articulated. To phrase the 
matter in contemporary terms, the relationship 
between “criticism” of Jewish agency (in this 
instance, the direction taken by mainstream 
Zionism) and antisemitism (the myth of Jewish 
domination and the inversion of the actual rela-
tionship between Jews and the “big powers”) is 
completely rejected. For Arendt, decisions (even 
ones she considered wrong) taken “innocently” 
can be, indeed, will be, filtered and re-presented 
through the Jewish question.
As such, it would be the gravest of errors 
to interpret Arendt’s words as claiming that 
the antisemitism (and what would become 
antizionism) of which she warns is a direct con-
sequence of decisions and acts made by Jews. 
Not only does this error rest on a complete mis-
understanding of Arendt’s critique of antisemi-
tism, especially in its ideological formulations, 
it also overlooks her reference to “Jews who 
know their own history.”
In addition to recognizing the mala fide of 
antisemitism and antizionism, we see Arendt’s 
frustration with the General Zionists. For her, 
their decision to seek out support of the “big 
powers” replicates the older Jewish tendency, in 
the age before rights, to seek support and pro-
tection from Kings and Lords rather than from 
the peoples among whom they lived. From 
Arendt’s perspective, therefore, this latest deci-
sion was part and parcel of Jewish “worldless-
ness” and political naiveté which she believed 
was possibly the major characteristic of Jewish 
history. While Arendt may have been mistaken 
as to the veracity of this history,26 it nonethe-
less explains the nature of her angry chiding of 
mainstream zionism.
This reading of Arendt’s anger and frustra-
tion with contemporary Zionist and Jewish 
politics is supported by her more measured 
consideration of the alleged relationship 
between Jewish agency and antisemitism. Fine 
and Spencer frame this aspect of her thought in 
the context of the confusion “between how Jews 
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responded to antisemitism and their responsibility 
for antisemitism.” Noting that, as in the present 
case, “Arendt’s use of language strayed over this 
line,” they write:
[H]er considered judgement was best summed 
up in the statement that to treat the behaviour 
of Jews as the source of antisemitism is “the 
malicious and stupid insight of antisemites, 
who think that this vile tenet can account for 
the hecatombs of human sacrifice.” Arendt 
may not have been wholly consistent, but at 
the core of her argument lay a refusal on the 
one hand to blame the Jews for antisemitism 
and on the other to rationalise Jewish responses 
to antisemitism.27 
Arendt was, however, correct about one thing: 
that the decision of the General Zionists to seek 
assistance from the colonial powers has become 
incorporated within the negative framework 
of the Jewish question. The question to be 
addressed now, therefore, is whether with the 
creation of Israel, and the corresponding focus 
of this “question” onto that State, we can con-
tinue to speak of the ideology of antisemitism 
or whether we are better advised to speak, with 
reference to Arendt’s comment about a “new-
wave of Jew hatred” of the ideologization of 
antizionism.
Antisemitism and Antizionism
In the chapter “The Return of the Jewish ques-
tion and the Double Life of Israel,” Fine and 
Spencer write that
[t]he most significant expression of the recon-
figuring of the Jewish question in the present 
period lies in the negative representations of 
Israel and Zionism. While the stigmatization 
of the idea of a Jewish nation may be traced 
back to the Enlightenment credo that every-
thing should be granted to Jews “as individu-
als” and nothing to Jews “as a nation,” it frames 
the Jewish question in ways that could not 
have existed prior to the actual rise of Zionism 
as a political movement and especially prior 
to the formation of the state of Israel and the 
Holocaust.28 
In this section, remaining sensitive to the dialec-
tic of continuity and discontinuity, I argue that 
this “reconfiguration of the Jewish question” 
is represented through the novel ideology of 
antizionism. On the one hand, continuity can 
be identified in the general connection between 
the Jewish question and Jewish emancipation; 
while, on the other hand, discontinuity appears 
in the particular nature of that emancipation. 
In other words, the ideology of antisemitism 
emerged in reaction to the Jews’ emancipation 
within the nation state, whereas the ideology of 
antizionism is the reaction of the Jewish ques-
tion to Jews’ emancipation through the nation-
state with Israel as the “national homeland of the 
Jewish people”. 
As the discussion of Arendt’s understand-
ing of ideology illustrates, there is a difference 
between the actuality of Jewish relations within 
the emerging nation-state and the ideological 
formulation of the relations. Looking today at 
the debates raging in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury over Jewish emancipation, it is difficult to 
recognize any anti-emancipationist argument 
that did not fall under the spell of the Jewish 
question. In many ways, the nature of these 
“debates” was set by what, avant la lettre, we can 
now identify as Bauer’s antisemitic eponymous, 
The Jewish Question.29 Be that as it may, it is 
obvious that in the era after emancipation calls 
for its reversal could not but be antisemitic. 
Indeed, in this context, as Arendt shows, it is 
interesting to note that antisemitism as an ideol-
ogy not only crystallized after emancipation was 
granted to Jews but also emerged at the time 
when the actual relations between Jews and the 
nation-state that the Jewish question distorted 
had ended.30
The same cannot be said of debates around 
Zionism, at least up to the founding of Israel. 
Anti-Zionism was a central debating point 
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within many Jewish communities both within 
the diaspora and the Yishuv. However, like the 
previous experience of Jewish emancipation 
within the nation-state, after 1948 the sub-
stance of these debates—the for, the against, 
the maybes—became incorporated within the 
Jewish question as the ideological formulation of 
antizionism broke with empirical anti-Zionism.
This confusion, between historical anti- 
Zionism (i.e. intra-communal debates) and the 
contemporary ideology of antizionism, has mud-
died the waters of the Jewish question. It is not 
uncommon, for example, to find that antizion-
ists will often not only draw on historical anti- 
Zionism as justifications for their own position, 
but, in so doing, claim further that their contem-
porary articulation of the Jewish question, the 
ideology of antizionism, represents an unbroken 
line with that earlier tradition. However, these 
claims, both of which turn on the dialectic of 
continuity and discontinuity, can be challenged.
As we have seen, the continuities that exist 
between antisemitism and antizionism are a 
staple ingredient of much recent critical litera-
ture. Of the concepts that capture this continu-
ity, the most thoughtful is that of “antisemitic 
anti-Zionism.” At the heart of this concept 
is the idea that the content of the ideology of 
antisemitism has now shifted its focus from “the 
Jews” to the Jewish state, Israel. Alan Johnson 
describes this continuity succinctly:
Antisemitic anti-Zionism bends the meaning 
of Israel and Zionism out of shape until both 
become fit receptacles for the tropes, images, 
and ideas of classical antisemitism. In short, that 
which demonological Jew once was, demonological 
Israel now is; uniquely malevolent, full of blood-
lust, all controlling, always acting in bad faith, 
the obstacle to a better, purer, more spiritual 
world, deserving of punishment and so on.31
On one level, there is little here with which to 
disagree. Johnson captures well the echoes of 
antisemitism within antizionist representations 
of Israel: the believed existence of an omnipotent 
“Israel Lobby”; Zionist “pleasure” in the tar-
geting and killing of Palestinian children; that 
if it were it not for the creation and existence 
of Israel, peace would reign throughout the 
Middle East; etc., etc. All of this is correct.
However, on another level, I see two short-
comings to Johnson’s approach. First, if, as I 
am arguing, the creation of Israel, the national 
emancipation of the Jews brings with it a cor-
responding shift in the Jewish question, then 
treating antizionism as a reworking of the “clas-
sical” tropes of antisemitism, overlooks what 
precisely is new or novel about it.
The second point is that the idea of “antise-
mitic anti-Zionism” dovetails into the claim 
made by antizionists (noted above) that their 
own antizionism continues the tradition of 
pre-1948 anti-Zionism. In other words, despite 
the intention of the author, the concept of 
“antisemitic anti-Zionism” could be read that—
if scrubbed of its antisemitic dimensions—
anti-Zionism or, rather, antizionism can remain 
a legitimate political aim. Jewish national eman-
cipation can be understood as temporary and 
reversible, just as was Jews’ earlier emancipation 
within the nation-state. Understood in these 
terms, as powerful and accurate the concept of 
“antisemitic anti-Zionism” is, it perhaps fails to 
confront fully antizionist claims of a distinc-
tion, on the one hand, between antisemitism 
and antizionism and, on the other, the claim 
that they are “simply” drawing on the easier 
Jewish anti-Zionist debates of the pre-1948 era. 
The shortcomings of the “continuity” thesis 
in the concept of “antisemitic anti-Zionism” are 
less that the concept is inaccurate—far from 
it—but that it presents an incomplete picture 
of antizionism. It fails to fully acknowledge 
discontinuity—that with the founding of Israel 
a new episode within the Jewish Question has 
been inaugurated.
The Ideologization of Antizionism
I have argued that, just as the “response” of the 
Jewish question to Jewish emancipation within 
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the nation-state was an ideology of antisem-
itism, the response to Jewish national self- 
determination is the ideology of antizionism. 
Likewise, just as the ideology of antisemitism 
incorporated within it aspects of that emanci-
pation, so too does the ideology of antizionism. 
And, finally, just as the ideology of antisemitism 
distorted and mythologized those empirical 
aspects of emancipation so as to fit its “axiom-
atically accepted premise,” there is something 
inherent about Jews that not only made eman-
cipation an error, but that, for the sake of the 
nation-state, needed to be reversed—so too does 
the ideology of antizionism distort and mythol-
ogize; that there is something inherent about the 
movement for Jewish national self-determination 
as well as about Israel itself that makes it both 
illegitimate and reversible. Perhaps the clearest 
statement on these points was made by Labour 
NEC member, Huda Elmi:
The biggest contention that my fellow critics 
of the IHRA have is with a particular one that 
focuses on calling the [sic] state of Israel a racist 
endeavour. IHRA’s defenders like to say that 
it allows for criticisms of the policies of Israel, 
but not on the endeavour of building the [sic]32 
Israeli state per se. But that is an impossible dis-
tinction to make in practice. Allowing criticism 
of policies but not allowing a discussion of 
the ideologies of political movements that are 
behind those policies is nonsensical. It is like 
saying that you are allowed to criticise privatisa-
tion, because it is a policy, but you aren’t allowed 
to look that to neoliberalism as the ideology that 
upholds this.33 
What this statement makes clear is that the very 
essence of Zionism both in thought and practice 
is some “original sin” that can never be eradi-
cated and that, until it is, the harm it inflicts 
on the world can never be undone. Placed in 
the frame of the Jewish question, Zionism-and-
Israel is one emancipation too far.
Implicit in Elmi’s own comments is the 
slogan, “Zionism is racism.” The origin of this 
slogan can be traced back to the propaganda of 
the Soviet Union. As Tabarovsky shows,34 it is a 
reworking of the older idea of “Jewish exclusiv-
ity” and the image that was later radicalized into 
the dogma that “the Jews” believe in their “own 
racial superiority.” The historical source of this 
slogan demonstrates another continuity. It proj-
ects and secularizes onto Jews the religious isola-
tion that was forced onto them in the premodern 
era and that was repeated in the modern era in 
the face of the difficulties of assimilation. Today, 
it distorts the reality of the “right to return” and 
the historical reasons for this policy. The notion 
of a malevolence inherent in Zionism and, there-
fore, in Israel appears in many guises, then. Some 
are reformulations of older libels, while others 
are of more recent and specific origin.
Thus, alongside the continuity of rework-
ing of familiar themes as identified by Alan 
Johnson, novel ones have appeared specifically 
relating to Zionism and Israel. Here, one need 
only refer back to Hannah Arendt’s prediction 
about how the General Zionist decision to seek 
support from the colonial powers would feed 
into the Jewish question. Although always a 
staple of post-war antizionist ideology, Israel’s 
link with the colonial powers—the narrative 
that the new state is itself an iteration of “settler- 
colonialism”—is now becoming the central 
plank of that ideology.
Further examples include the claim of 
Zionist-Nazi collaboration. Repeated recently 
by former Labour MP and Mayor of London, 
Ken Livingstone, this allegation rests on a dis-
tortion of the Haavara Agreement in which an 
attempt to escape Nazi Germany in 1933 led a 
tiny minority of Zionists (in a move opposed by 
almost all other Zionist and Jewish groups) to 
seek accommodation with the Nazis for passage 
to Palestine in exchange for purchasing German 
goods. Here we see a clear example of the way 
in which a particular moment of Jewish agency 
becomes essentialized into the very practice of 
Zionism itself.
Yet it is around the Holocaust and Holocaust 
memorialization that the interplay of continuity 
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and discontinuity becomes apparent. In many 
ways, they are the hinge that connects the 
ideology of antisemitism with the ideology of 
antizionism. This point comes into relief in 
the presentation of the Holocaust as an “end 
point” of the ideology of antisemitism at the 
same time that it becomes a key component 
of the ideology of antizionism. This duality 
appears in the antizionist notion that Israel was 
“gifted” to “the Jews” because of the world’s 
guilt about the horrors inflicted on Jews by the 
Nazis; that the memory of the Shoah is abused 
by “the Zionists” not only to legitimize an oth-
erwise illegitimate state, but also to mask—and 
justify—its own “Nazi-like” crimes against 
Palestinians; that “the Jews,” now cast as “the 
Zionists,” have failed to “learn the lesson of the 
Holocaust,”35 as if the Nazi “final solution of 
the Jewish question” was nothing other than an 
exercise in moral pedagogy; that “the Zionists” 
exploit the memory of the Holocaust as a tool 
to silence its “critics”; that in referencing the 
specific place of Jews within the Nazi antise-
mitic imagination, “the Jew” and “the Zionists” 
are seeking special privileges for themselves. 
Put plainly, while the ideology of antizionism 
recognizes the ideology of antisemitism at play 
in the mass murders of the Nazis, it simulta-
neously inverts the Holocaust—the moment of 
Jews’ ultimate powerlessness—into that of their 
ultimate power.36
These observations around the place of the 
Holocaust as the hinge between the ideology 
of antisemitism and the ideology of antizion-
ism return us to Marr and Badiou. In both 
instances, claims were made for a radical breach 
between previous formulations of anti-Jewish 
hostility and their own contemporary formu-
lations. Yet, as we have seen, these claims are 
spurious at best. Just as the ideology of antisem-
itism, as a “response” to the actuality of Jewish 
emancipation within the nation-state was a 
combination of the old and the new, so too 
is the ideology of antizionism a “response” to 
the actuality of Jewish emancipation through 
national self-determination. 
Taken together, the point is less the play of 
continuity and discontinuity, and the prove-
nance of the distortions, than their combina-
tion and realignment within a novel ideological 
formulation of antizionism—an ideology that, 
although part of the overarching Jewish ques-
tion has been fitted to the circumstance of a 
new era and new praxis of Jewish emancipation. 
This realignment has its own consequences.
As we have seen, the nature of the Jewish 
question is to oppose Jewish emancipation in 
all its forms. At its heart, therefore, is the conse-
quence of Jewish exclusion. It follows from this 
point that, although the shift from the ideology 
of antisemitism to the ideology of antizionism 
brings with it the demand for such exclusion, 
the basis on which it is justified also shifts. To 
put it another way, in keeping with this ideo-
logical shift, contemporary calls for Jews’ exclu-
sion are no longer premised on the basis of 
religion or “race.” Instead, they are predicated 
on “political” grounds: whether Israeli nationals 
or citizens of other countries, Jews are defined 
as “supporters of Israel” or “Zionists.” Needless 
to say, the “Israeli” or the “Zionist” that must 
be excluded from the international polity, has 
little to do with the reality of Israel (including 
all its flaws) or the reality of Zionism—rather, it 
reflects the distorted picture of both that results 
from the continuity and discontinuity of the 
Jewish question.
In a further attempt to disassociate the ide-
ology of antizionism from antisemitism, while 
simultaneously reducing the latter to the pseudo- 
science of “race,” the much older myth of 
Jewish “stubbornness” makes its return. It is 
in this context that the claim that it is only 
“Zionists” and not “the Jews” who are demon-
ized gains its justification. Since Jewish harm-
fulness is no longer presented as “racially” 
predestined, those who remain committed to 
the image of Israel and Zionism as projected by 
the ideology of antizionism are treated as freely 
choosing evil and its harmfulness. Since it is a 
matter of free will, the demand for exclusion 
is further legitimized and the responsibility for 
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exclusion passed onto the excluded themselves; 
those who will not renounce the malevolence 
inherent in this latest episode of the error of 
Jewish emancipation.
CONCLUSION
I have argued here that antizionism is distinct 
from anti-Zionism. Like antisemitism, anti- 
Zionism falls within Arendt’s definition of 
ideology. Further, I have argued that both must 
be understood in the context of the Jewish 
question and that, in this context, the breaks 
between antisemitism and antizionism display 
both continuity and discontinuity.
The necessity of recognizing the existence 
of the ideology of antizionism as connected 
to, but distinct from, the ideology of antisem-
itism is more than a matter of semantics. The 
ideology of antizionism represents a new and 
novel “reconfiguration” of the Jewish question. 
Although the nature of its anti-Jewish nature 
remains constant, its particular form and con-
tent is intimately connected to the specificities 
of Jewish emancipation. As much as Jewish 
emancipation adopts new forms so too does 
the ideological form of the Jewish question 
alter. In content and form, the ideology of 
antisemitism emerged and crystallized precisely 
at the moment Jews finally gained emancipa-
tion within the nation-state, achieved national 
self-determination. Moreover, antizionism, like 
antisemitism, was itself a combination of the 
old and the new, of continuity and discon-
tinuity. Israel is new to the world and so too 
is the response from, and shape of, the Jewish 
question. The ideology of antizionism is that 
response. What is called for is not the sub-
sumption of antizionism beneath antisemitism. 
What is needed is recognition of the ways in 
which the ideology of antizionism has incorpo-
rated the ideology of antisemitism.
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